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I. INTRODUCTION

In 1996, the Florida Legislature passed section 542.335,1 a complete
revision of Florida's statute governing the enforceability of restrictive
* Winner, Gertrude Brick Law Review Prize. Dedicated to my parents, Earl J. and
Marilyn C. Wagner, and to my sister, Catherine R. Wagner, for all their love and support.
1. FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (Supp. 1996).
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covenants between employers and employees.' Unlike the Legislature's
previous offerings in this area,3 section 542.335 was not a response to
a tendency in the judiciary to provide too much protection for employers
or too little freedom to employees.4 Rather, the Legislature passed
section 542.335 to bring order to an increasingly unpredictable area of
the law.' Consequently, section 542.335 should be judged by its ability
to increase certainty while maintaining balance between employee and
employer interests.6
To provide a context for analysis of the new statute, the next three
parts of this Note track the history of Florida law regarding the
enforceability of restrictive covenants. Part II considers the period
ranging from the early English common law through the enactment in
1953 of Florida's first statute in the area.7 Part Ifi discusses developments under section 542.33 between 1953 and 1990. Part IV analyzes
changes wrought by a 1990 amendment to the original statute.' Parts V
and VI of this Note discuss the new statute. Part V examines section
542.335's contents, identifying potential litigation issues and offering
drafting recommendations. Finally, part VI appraises section 542.335's
success in accomplishing the Legislature's objectives.
H. COMMON LAW
Driven by a dearth in able bodied laborers following the Black Death
and by the subsequent rise of craft guilds, the early English common
law exhibited an extreme distaste for restrictive covenants.9 No reported
common law opinion enforced a restrictive covenant against an

2. See id.; cf. John A. Grant & Thomas A. Steele, RestrictiveCovenants: FloridaReturns
to the Original "Unfair Competition" Approachfor the 21st Century, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1996, at

53, 53 (observing that § 542.335 "establish[es] a comprehensive framework for analyzing,
evaluating, and enforcing 'restrictive covenants' in Florida").
3. FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1953); FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1995); see infra pts. III & IV.
4. See Grant & Steele, supra note 2, at 53 (implying that the rules created by the
decisions of the courts "were in hopeless disarray"). Section 542.335's Senate sponsor and its
principle drafter wrote this article. Id. at 53.
5. See id. at 53-54 (reviewing briefly the failure of the prior statutes to achieve consistent
and principled decisions).
6. See id. at 55-56 (discussing the reasons why § 542.335 is a more balanced statute).
7. The original statute originally was codified at § 542.12. See FLA. STAT. § 542.12
(1953). The Legislature renumbered § 542.12 as § 542.33 in 1980. See Act of May 20, 1980,
1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-28, § 2.
8. Act of June 28, 1990, 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-216, § 1 (codified at FLA. STAT. §
542.33(2)(a) (Supp. 1996)).
9. See ANTHONY C. VALIULIS, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: FORMs, TAcTICS, AND
THE LAW 155-58 (1985) (reviewing the development of a policy favoring the right to work).
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employee prior to the seventeenth century." During the seventeenth,
eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, the English courts developed a
reasonableness test which afforded employers relief in limited circumstances."' By the conclusion of the nineteenth century, the English
courts upheld a restrictive covenant against an employee if the covenant
satisfied each of three conditions. 2 First, the employer had to demonstrate a "legitimate interest" worthy of protection. 3 Second, the
restraint had to be narrowly tailored to protect that interest.14 Lastly,
the restraint could not conflict with the public interest. 5
While most of the United States developed rules similar to those
employed in England, 6 Florida's common law carried a relatively
restrictive view of non-competition agreements well into the twentieth
century. 7 Because employers typically sought injunctive relief, Florida
courts could employ principles of equity to protect employees' freedom
to work.'
The Supreme Court of Florida's most influential common law
opinion, Love v. Miami Laundry Co., 9 typifies Florida's common law

10. Id. at 158.
11. See id. at 159-61 (discussing the development of the reasonableness test); Harlan M.
Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REv. 625, 638-43 (1960).
12. Valiulis, supra note 9, at 164-65.
13. Id.
14. See id. ("[A] covenant.., would be upheld provided it was no broader than
necessary.....
15. Id.
16. See id. at 165; Blake, supra note 11, at 645-46.
17. See Kendall B. Coffey & Thomas F. Nealon, III, Noncompete Agreements Under
Florida Law: A Retrospective and a Requiem?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1105, 1106 (1992);
Grant & Steele, supra note 2, at 53; Leslie A. Wickes, Note, Florida'sNoncompetition Statute:
An Analysis of the 1990 Amendment, 44 FLA. L. REv. 259, 264 (1992).
18. See, e.g., Simms v. Bumette, 46 So. 90, 91 (Fla. 1908); Simms v. Patterson, 46 So.
91, 91 (Fla. 1908). In Burnette, the Supreme Court of Florida construed the question of the
enforceability to the non-competition agreement before it as follows:
The view we take of this contract renders much of the discussion in the briefs of
counsel useless. This case does not present a question as to the reasonableness of
the contract, tested by the "restraint of trade" rule, but whether a court of equity
will intervene to enforce specific performance thereof negatively by enjoining its
breach.
Burnette, 46 So. at 91.
19. 160 So. 32 (Fla. 1935). Subsequent common law opinions consistently cited Love to
support holdings in favor of employees. See J. Schaeffer, Inc. v. Hoppen, 173 So. 900, 900-01
(Fla. 1937); Lewis v. Kirkland, 160 So. 44, 44-45 (Fla. 1935); Nettles v. City Ice & Fuel Co.,
160 So. 42, 43-44 (Fla. 1935); Wheeler v. Mickles, 160 So. 45, 45 (Fla. 1935). But see Arond
v. Grossman, 75 So. 2d 593, 594-95 (Fla. 1954) (holding that a non-competition agreement
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treatment of restrictive covenants between employers and employees. In
Love, a laundry company executed at-will employment contracts with
three truck drivers.2" In return, each driver promised that, after the
conclusion of his employment, he would not solicit or serve the
laundry's customers with whom he had contact during his employment." When the drivers quit their jobs, the laundry sought to enjoin
them from working elsewhere.'
The Love court emphasized two factors in its analysis.23 First, the
court found that employers often utilize their relatively strong bargaining
positions to force contractual terms on employees2 Consequently, the
court found that the bulk of contractual obligations usually fall on
employees2 Second, the Love court found that the laundry had not
acquired any "property right" through the drivers' employment which
deserved protection.26 Although the drivers constituted the laundry's
sole source of customer contact, the supreme court attributed any
27
goodwill from such contact to the talents and effort of the drivers.
Although the contract remained enforceable at law, the Love court found
that these factors made the contract unfair and unreasonable such that

between employer corporation and employee was enforceable under common law principles
where a fiduciary relationship existed between the employee and the plaintiff stemming from
the employee's role as a officer, director, and employee of the employer and the shareholders'
agreement provided mutuality of remedies). Love also has garnered attention from academics.
See, e.g., Valiulis, supra note 9, at 19; Blake, supra note 11, at 664-65.
20. Love, 160 So. at 34.
21. Id. at 35-36. The language of the covenant stated that the driver promised:
That for the space of one year after his discharge or quitting the employment of
[the laundry] company, he will not either directly or indirectly, either for himself
or any other person, firm, company or corporation, call upon, solicit, divert, take
away, or attempt to solicit, divert or take away any of the customers, business or
patronage of such company upon whom he called or whom he solicited or to whom
he catered or became acquainted with at the time of his employment with said
company, or with whom he became acquainted or on whom he called or to whom
he catered after his employment with [the laundry].
Id. at 36.
22. Id. at 33.
23. See id. at 36.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. The Love court found that the laundry's patronage was sufficiently "universal" that
it had not acquired any "property right" in the employees' knowledge of customer identities. Id.
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a court of equity should not enforce it.2" Accordingly, the Love court
denied the laundry's request for an injunction.29
The outcome in Love was not unique.3" The Supreme Court of
Florida's last common law opinion regarding restrictive covenants,
Arond v. Grossman,3 marked the first Florida appellate opinion to
uphold a restrictive covenant against an employee.32 Instead of proving
an aberration, Arond portended the impact of Florida's first statute
governing the enforceability of restrictive covenants.
Ill. 1953-1990: THE ORiGiNAL STATUTE
In 1953, the Florida Legislature entered the restrictive covenant arena
for the first time. Its contribution, section 542.12 (recodified as section
542.33 in 1980)," 3 provided in relevant part:
(1) Every contract by which anyone is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade or business of any
kind, otherwise than is provided by subsection (2)...
hereof, is to that extent void.
(2) ... [O]ne who is employed as an agent or employee
may agree with his employer, to refrain from carrying on or
engaging in a similar business and from soliciting old
customers of such employer within a reasonably limited
time and area .... so long as such employer continues to
carry on a like business therein. Said agreement may, in the
discretion of a court of competent jurisdiction be enforced
by injunction.3"
Although the statute made an employee's covenant not to compete with
an employer generally enforceable, its plain language left the judiciary's
discretion to grant injunctive relief unscathed.35 Thus, one might have

28. Id. at 38.
29. Id.
30. See supra note 19.

31. 75 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1954).
32. Arond, 75 So. 2d at 595; Coffey & Nealon, supra note 17, at 1106; Wickes, supra
note 17, at 264. The Arond court did not explain why newly enacted § 542.12 of the Florida
Statutes did not govern the dispute. See Arond, 72 So. 2d at 594-95.
33. See supra note 7.

34. FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1953). The statute also validated restrictive covenants incident
to the sale of a business, to a shareholder's sale of all of his or her shares in a corporation, and
to the dissolution of a partnership. Id. § 542.12(2), (3). These covenants also had to be
reasonable in time and area. Id. This Note focusses on restrictive covenants in the employeremployee context because such covenants are the most common and the most controversial.
35. See id. § 542.12(2).
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expected the Florida courts to resume their common law practice of
employing equitable principles to deny injunctive relief to employers. In
6
fact, the Florida courts took a drastically different course.
37
In an early case, Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., the
Supreme Court of Florida held that the courts should enforce a
restrictive covenant so "as to protect the legitimate interests of the
employer without doing harm to the public interest, and without38
inflicting an unduly harsh or oppressive result on the employee.
Applying this test, the Capelouto court granted injunctive relief to an
exterminating company by prohibiting a former branch manager from
years throughout the area he had
competing with the company for two
39
behalf.
employer's
the
on
serviced
Significantly, the Capelouto court's reasoning turned the supreme
court's approach in Love on its head. In determining the appropriateness
of injunctive relief, the Capelouto court found no "special equities...
4
that would not be present in almost every case of this nature." In
41
contrast with the court in Love, the Capelouto court did not consider
whether the exterminating company may have forced the terms of the

36. See Wickes, supra note 17, at 264-67. This departure was in part facilitated by an
early holding that § 542.12 superseded Florida's common law precedents. See Atlas Travel
Serv., Inc. v. Morelly, 98 So. 2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1st DCA 1957) (stating that normally statutory
law, however unwise, "supercedes the common law"). In Atlas Travel, the First District Court
of Appeal noted:

mhe controlling factor distinguishing [Love v. Miami Laundry Co.] is that it was
decided according to the common law governing contracts executed prior to the
enactment of [§ 542.12] whereas the case on appeal involves a contract executed
after the enactment....
The courts are not concerned with the wisdom of statutory law, and one that
expressly or by implication supersedes the common law and which does not do
violence to organic provisions or principles becomes the controlling law within its
proper sphere of operation.
Id. at 818 (citations omitted). The statute also survived two early constitutional attacks. See
Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 183 So. 2d 532, 534 (Fla. 1966) (holding that § 542.12
did not violate due process or deny equal protection under the Florida or Federal constitutions);
Standard Newspapers, Inc. v. Woods, 110 So. 2d 397, 400 (Fla. 1959) ("We cannot agree that
an act is unconstitutional that denounces in the main agreements designed to prevent a person
from following his lawful 'profession, trade or business' when such agreements ... have for so
long been rejected by the courts for fundamental reasons.").
37. 182 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 1966).
38. Id. at 534.
39. Id. at 534-35.
40. Id. at 535.
41. Love, 160 So. at 36.
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restrictive covenant on its employee.42 Moreover, whereas the Love
court had limited an employer's legitimate interests to "property rights"
the employer had acquired in an employee's skills or knowledge,43 the
Capelouto court did not conduct an inquiry into the existence of such
rights." Instead, the Capelouto court upheld the covenant's time and
area restrictions without explanation except to note that the restrictions
were reasonable.45 Furthermore, even though the Capeloutocourt added
a public interest factor to its analysis, the court did not find any
"overriding public interest in having the [former branch manager's]
46
services available to it."
Courts after Capelouto analyzed restrictive covenants in much the
same way. While sometimes parroting the Capeloutocourt's "legitimate
interests" terminology,47 subsequent courts refused to limit enforcement
of restrictive covenants to circumstances in which an employer could
demonstrate the existence of the type of property rights the Love court
found necessary to justify a covenant. 48 Future courts also used the
Capelouto court's unpredictable case-by-case approach to evaluate
covenants' reasonableness in time and area.49 Moreover, public interest
42. See Capelouto, 183 So. 2d at 533-35.
43. Love, 160 So. at 36.
44. See Capelouto, 183 So. 2d at 533-35.
45. See id. at 534 (stating that there was no reason to overturn the chancellor's
determination that the restrictions in the covenant were reasonable).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Miller Mechanical, Inc. v. Ruth, 300 So. 2d 11, 12 (Fla. 1974).
48. See, e.g., Twenty Four Collection, Inc. v. Keller, 389 So. 2d 1062, 1063 (3d DCA)
(rejecting a balancing approach which would consider an employer's "legitimate competitive
concerns"), rev. denied, 389 So. 2d 1048 (Fla. 1980).
49. See, e.g., Dorminy v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 464 So. 2d 154, 157 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985);
Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Girardeau, 301 So. 2d 38, 39-40 (1st DCA 1974), cert. denied, 317
So. 2d 75 (Fla. 1975); Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So. 2d 239, 241 (Fla. 2d DCA
1973). The reasonable area over which a court will enforce a restraint usually has been limited
to the area in which the employee worked or the area from which the employer draws
customers. See, e.g., Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551 So. 2d 503, 506 (Fla. 2d DCA
1989) (upholding geographic reasonableness of covenant preventing deliveryman from servicing
customers in same area he had worked for a previous employer). The reasoning behind this trend
is straightforward. An employer cannot suffer harm from a former employee's competition in
an area where the employee has not developed customer contacts or where the employer is not
operating.
The question with respect to reasonableness in time has produced less uniformity. As noted
above, in Capelouro, the Supreme Court of Florida upheld a two-year restraint. 183 So. 2d at
534; see supra pt. II.B. Subsequently, the Florida courts validated restraints extending over one
or two years. Dorminy v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 464 So. 2d 154, 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Courts
have upheld restraints extending over longer periods in cases involving employees in
management or where the court found that the employee held a "key" or "important" position.
Id. For example, in Dorminy v. FrankB. Hall & Co., the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld
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arguments did not prove a popular tool for invalidating covenants.5
Finally, the judiciary eventually eliminated consideration of any
oppressive effects of a covenant on an employee from its analyses.5
Two Supreme Court of Florida decisions further eroded employees'
protection from restrictive covenants. First, in Miller Mechanical, Inc.
v. Ruth, 2 the supreme court held that a court could modify unreasonable time and area terms to make them reasonable and then enforce the
restraint as if it originally contained the reasonable terms. 3 Thus, an
employer could draft a covenant containing unreasonable terms with
54
confidence that at least some of the covenant would be enforced.

a three-year restraint against the former chief executive officer of three insurance companies.
Id. at 156, 158. Similarly, in Mathieu v. Old Town FlowerShops, Inc., the Fourth District Court
of Appeal held that a "lower-level sales associate" was "important" enough to justify a restraint
extending over three years. Mathieu v. Old Town Flower Shops, Inc., 585 So. 2d 1160, 1161
(Fla. 4th DCA 1991). Although the Mathieu court found three years to be the outer limit for a
restraint against the lower-level sales associate, the court noted in dictum that higher level
employees could be restricted for longer periods of time. Id.
50. The original statute did not contain language empowering a court to refuse to enforce
a restraint because it conflicted with the public interest. See FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1953).
However, in Capelouto, the Supreme Court of Florida held that an entire restraint could be
invalidated on that basis. Capelouto, 183 So. 2d at 534. In Lloyd Damsey, M.D. v. Mankowitz,
the Third District Court of Appeal put this prerogative in action. 339 So. 2d 282, 283 (Fla. 3d
DCA 1976). In Damsey, the court refused to prevent a surgeon from practicing medicine in a
part of the Florida Keys. Id. The Damsey court found that the court below could deny injunctive
relief based on the equities because of the impact of moving on a "professional man" and
because of the need for the surgeon's services in the area. Id.
Damsey proved an isolated deviation in Florida's non-competition agreement jurisprudence.
Even in other cases involving physicians, the courts proved hesitant to invalidate a restraint
based on the public interest. See, e.g.; Jewett Orthopedic Clinic v. White, 629 So. 2d 922, 926
(Fla. 5th DCA 1994). Moreover, the devaluation of equitable considerations in the years
following Damsey diminished its precedential value. See infra notes 52-63 and accompanying
text.
51. See Twenty Four Collection, 389 So. 2d at 1063 ("lilt is established law that a court
is not empowered to refuse to give effect to [a restrictive covenant] on the basis of a finding,
as was the case below, that enforcement of its terms would produce an 'unjust result' in the
form of an overly burdensome effect upon the employee.").
52. 300 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 1974).
53. Id. at 12-13. Miller Mechanical was consistent with the language of the original §
542.12, which made a non-competition agreement which did not fall into one of the exceptions
making a contract enforceable "to that extent void." FLA. STAT. § 542.12 (1953). Subsequent
amendments did not change the "to that extent" language in the statute. See Act of June 28,
1990, 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-216, § 1; Act of July 6, 1988, 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-400, § 1; Act
of May 21, 1987, 1987 Laws of Florida ch. 87-40, § 1. Accordingly, subsequent courts
continued to follow the Miller Mechanical rule. See, e.g., Mathieu v. Old Town Flower Shops,
Inc., 585 So. 2d 1160, 1161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (enforcing five-year restraint for three years).
54. See Brett D. Pynnonen, Comment, Ohio and Michigan Law on Postemployment
Covenants Not to Compete, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 215, 224 (1994).
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Second, in Capraro v. Lanier Business Products, Inc.,5 the supreme
court held that courts should presume irreparable harm in actions for
injunctive relief.5 6 Capraro materially reduced an employer's burden
in restrictive covenant cases because irreparable harm is a necessary
condition to obtaining injunctive relief,57 and as was the case at
common law, the injunction was employers' favorite remedy under the
statute. 8
The cumulative effect of Florida's jurisprudence under the original
statute left employees with only a small part of the protection they
enjoyed at common law.59 After Capraro,the courts' only responsibilities in granting injunctive relief were to determine whether an employee
breached a restrictive covenant, to determine whether an adequate
remedy existed at law, and to modify a covenant's time and area terms
as necessary to make them reasonable.' Employers had little difficulty
demonstrating the absence of an adequate legal remedy, 1 and no
Florida court invalidated an entire restraint based on unreasonableness
in time or area. Thus, even though section 542.33's plain language gave
the courts discretion to deny injunctive relief, 2 employers could expect
injunctive relief once an employee breached a restrictive covenant. 3
55. 466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
56. Capraro,466 So. 2d at 213. This result was suggested as early as 1957 in one of the
first appellate decisions interpreting § 542.12. See Atlas Travel Serv., Inc. v. Morelly, 98 So.
2d 816, 818 (Fla. Ist DCA 1957). In Atlas Travel, the First District Court of Appeal observed:
The permissory language of [section 542.12], whereby agreements of the character
in suit "may," in the "discretion" of the court, "be enforced by injunction," does
not imply that the court is vested with an absolute or arbitrary discretion, and is
construed as requiring that the discretion shall be reasonably exercised to the end
that the object of the statute may not be nullified. The relief cannot be withheld
when the proofs, as in the case on appeal, reveal no other alternative.
Id. at 818 (citations omitted). In addition, the supreme court implicitly reached Capraro'sresult
a decade earlier in Miller Mechanical. The Miller Mechanicalcourt acknowledged that injunctive relief had become a "favored remedy" because of difficulties in proving damages for breach.
Miller Mechanical, 300 So. 2d at 13. As a result, the Miller Mechanical court held that a lower
court should grant an injunction to an employer after determining what would be a reasonable
time and area for the covenant. Id.
57. See Capraro,466 So. 2d at 213.
58. Id.; see Miller Mechanical, 300 So. 2d at 13.
59. See supra pt. II.
60. Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson, 551 So. 2d 503,509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (en banc).
61. See Miller Mechanical, 300 So. 2d at 13 ("It is precisely because damages are so
difficult to show that injunctive relief becomes a favored remedy.").
62. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2) (1989).
63. The Second District Court of Appeal's opinion in Sarasota Beverage Co. v. Johnson
demonstrates the cumulative effect of the Florida courts' interpretations of the original non-
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IV. 1990-1996: THE ORIGINAL STATUTE AMENDED
In 1990, the Legislature amended subsection 2(a) of section
542.33' by adding the following:
However, the court shall not enter an injunction contrary to
the public health, safety, or welfare or in any case where
the injunction enforces an unreasonable covenant not to
compete or where there is no showing of irreparable injury.
However, the use of specific trade secrets, customer lists, or
direct solicitation of existing customers shall be presumed
to be an irreparable injury and may be specifically enjoined.65
Some commentators viewed the 1990 amendment as a response to
Justice Overton's dissent in Capraro.' In that dissent, Justice Overton
argued that the supreme court had tipped the balance too far in favor of
employers and called upon the Legislature to amend the non-competition

competition statute. 551 So. 2d 503, 509 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (en banc). In SarasotaBeverage,
a deliveryman executed a non-competition agreement with a wholesale beer distributor promising
not to compete with the distributor in Sarasota and Manatee Counties for one and one-half years
after the termination of his employment. Id. at 505. The deliveryman quit after five and one-half
months on the job and subsequently accepted employment with another distributor. Id. Although
the deliveryman's initial route with his new employer principally was located in Sarasota county,
the new employer changed the route to include only a "couple of stops" in that county after the
former employer sued for an injunction to enforce the non-competition agreement. See id. at 505.
The SarasotaBeverage court noted that a court's "only authority ...

over the terms of a

noncompetition agreement is to determine reasonableness of the time and area limitations." Id.
at 506. In so doing, the court observed that any "unduly harsh [or] oppressive" effect on the
employee was irrelevant to the court's determination. Id. Moreover, the court held that any
reduction in the threat to the former employer by decreasing the deliveryman's activity in
Sarasota county also was irrelevant. See id. at 509.
The Sarasota Beverage court found the covenant's geographic area reasonable because it
was limited to the former employer's area of operations. Id. at 506-07. Furthermore, the
SarasotaBeverage court held that the agreement's one and a half year time limitation reasonable
even though the deliveryman had worked for the original employer for only five and one half
months. Id. at 507. Without observing whether the deliveryman had developed substantial
customer goodwill or knew any confidential information, the court agreed that the time
restriction was necessary to prevent the deliveryman from sharing timely confidential
information with a competitor and to allow the deliveryman's "relationship with ... Sarasota
Beverage customer[s] to go stale." Id. Accordingly, the Sarasota Beverage court remanded the
case to the trial court with an order to grant the former employer an injunction so long as it
could show the deliveryman had breached the non-competition covenant. lId at 509.
64. Act of June 28, 1990, 1990 Fla. Laws ch. 90-216, § 1.
65. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1995).
66. See Capraro,466 So. 2d at 213-14 (Overton, J., dissenting); Coffey & Nealon, supra
note 17, at 1135; Wickes, supra note 17, at 267.
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statute so that judges could employ "proper equitable principles" in
carving out injunctive relief.67
If judged by its satisfaction of Justice Overton's goals, the 1990
amendment was not a stunning success. Although the amendment
included language regarding the public health, welfare, and safety,
courts continued their practice of refusing to invalidate covenants based
on the public interest."' Moreover, the district courts of appeal split on
the question of whether the 1990 amendment changed the underlying
assumptions regarding the availability of injunctive relief to employers.6 9 The following sub-parts discuss the varying interpretations of the
1990 amendment amongst the district courts of appeal.
A. Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc.: Applying a
Legitimate Business Interest Test
In Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc.,"0 the Second District Court of
Appeal held that Florida law both before and after the 1990 amendment
embraced the "legitimate business interest" approach to restrictive
covenants.71 The court stated that this approach is employed in an
"overwhelming majority" of the states.72 According to Hapney, the
legitimate business interest approach requires an employer to plead and
prove the existence of a "reasonabl[e] relat[ionship]" between the terms
67. See Capraro,466 So. 2d at 214 (Overton, J., dissenting) (quoting Keller v. Twenty
Four Collection, Inc., 419 So. 2d 1048, 1050-51 (Fla. 1982)).
68. Only one court has considered a public health, safety, or welfare argument under the
1990 amendment. In Jewett OrthopaedicClinic, PA. v. White, the Fifth District Court of Appeal
held that the legislature intended for this language to codify the case law prior to the
amendment. 629 So. 2d 922, 925 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). The Jewett court found that this meant
that a restrictive covenant against a physician was not facially unreasonable. Id.
The Jewett court also rejected the Hapney legitimate business interest approach and
minimized the effect of the 1990 amendment on prior case law. See id. at 926; infra pt. IV.B.
Because the Hapney court found that the 1990 amendment revived the courts' prerogative to
weigh the equities in granting injunctive relief, a court following Hapney might be more
receptive to a public interest argument. See Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc., 579 So. 2d 127, 133
(2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1991), disapprovedon other grounds, Gupton v.
Village Key & Saw Shop, Inc., 656 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1995). As of yet, no such case has arisen.
69. See infra pts. IV.A-C.
70. 579 So. 2d 127 (2d DCA),.rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1991), disapproved on
other grounds, Gupton v. Village Key & Saw Shop, Inc., 656 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1995).
71. Id. at 130-31. Subsequently, the First District Court of Appeal and the Fourth District
Court of Appeal also adopted legitimate business interest approaches. See Kephart v. Hair
Returns, Inc., 685 So. 2d 959, 960 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Health Care Management Consulting,
Inc. v. McCombes, 661 So. 2d 1223, 1225-27 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). For a discussion of Kephart,
see infra note 105. For a discussion of McCombes, see infra notes 106-18 and accompanying
text.
72. Id. at 130.
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of a non-competition agreement and the employer's "legitimate business
interest[s]" to enforce the agreement against an employee.73 Courts
applying this approach reject covenants prohibiting "ordinary competition," instead requiring that an agreement prevent an employee from
gaining an "unfair advantage" vis-A-vis an employer. 4
Hapney identified three classes in a nonexclusive list of legitimate
business interests: "(1) trade secrets and confidential business lists,
records, and information, (2) customer goodwill, and (3)... extraordinary or specialized training provided by [an] employer."75 With the
exception of goodwill,76 Hapney and its progeny defined each legitimate business interest with reasonable clarity.77 Two courts found the
definition of "trade secrets" under the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets
Act controlling under section 542.33.78 To determine whether a
business list, record, or other information was a legitimate business
interest, the, courts focused on whether it was something otherwise
available to the employer's competitors and whether the employer held
it in confidence.79 Hapney itself defined "extraordinary training" as

73. Id. The Hapney court observed that legitimate business interests also are referred to
as "protectible interest[s]." Id
74. Id. (quoting Hasty v. Rent-A-Driver, Inc., 671 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tenn. 1984)).
75. Id. at 131.
76. Several courts have considered whether an employer had a legitimate business interest
in the goodwill associated with its employees. See, e.g., Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667 So.
2d 961, 964-65 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996). However, no court has defined goodwill in the context of
Hapney's legitimate business interest analysis.
77. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 132-34. Of course, an employer still could have difficulty
proving its interests satisfied a court's definition of a legitimate business interest. See, e.g.,
Health Care Management Consulting, Inc. v. McCombes, 661 So. 2d 1223, 1226 (Fla. 1st DCA
1995) (holding that an employer's methodology was not a trade secret because it "principally
involve[d] the interpretation of public Medicare regulations and, as such, [was] 'readily
ascertainable by proper means' through researching the Code of Federal Regulations").
78. Health Care Management Consulting,661 So. 2d at 1226; Lovell Farms, Inc. v. Levy,
641 So. 2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). Adopted in 1988, the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets
Act defines a "trade secret" as:
[I]nformation, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method,
technique, or process that:
(a) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being
generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and
(b) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to
maintain its secrecy.
FLA. STAT. § 688.002(4) (1995).
79. See, eg., Sabina v. Dahlia Corp., 650 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) ('The list
included twelve [of the insurance company's] customers' names, the estimated amount of annual
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"that which goes beyond what is usual, regular, common, or customary
in the industry in which the employee is employed."8
In application, the Hapney court held that courts should narrowly
tailor injunctive relief for the breach of a restrictive covenant around the
employer's legitimate business interests. An injunction that protected
anything beyond a legitimate business interest would, at least in part,
enjoin desirable, ordinary competition. 2 Thus, a court following
Hapney had to identify each relevant legitimate business interest and
narrowly tailor relief to preserve it. 3
Careful consideration of the relief necessary to protect each interest
was especially important under the 1990 amendment. The Hapney court
held that the 1990 amendment's express identification of trade secrets,
customer lists, and the prevention of direct solicitation of existing
customers warranted per se protection of those interests as legitimate
business interests. 4 However, other interests would warrant protection
"depending on the [level of] proof adduced."8 5 As a consequence of the
varying levels of proof required between interests, the 1990 amendment
created a danger that employers who could prove the interests expressly
protected by the 1990 amendment would attempt to use the presumption
of irreparable harm tied to those interests to secure injunctive relief
extending beyond that necessary to protect the interests to which the
presumption attached. If that happened, much of employees' benefit
from the legitimate business interest approach would be lost.
The Second District Court of Appeal avoided the temptation to
extend relief too broadly in Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc. 6 In Dyer,
the employee was a manager with Pioneer Concepts, a floor mainte-

commission earned for the agent, and the approximate expiration date of each customer's policy.
The list thus disclosed important confidential information about each account."); Kupscznk v.
Blasters, Inc., 647 So. 2d 888, 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) ("The unique methodology of highway
paint stripe removal is Blasters' trade secret or, at a minimum, confidential business information....").
80. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 132. Although the Hapney court referred to a legitimate
business interest in "extraordinary or specialized training," the court also noted that "[t]o
constitute a protectible interest... the providing of training or education must be extraordinary."
Id. at 131-32. Accordingly, Hapney implies that extraordinary training and specialized training
are identical rather than separate legitimate business interests.
81. Id. at 134; see Dyer v. Pioneer Concepts, Inc., 667 So. 2d 961, 965 (Fla. 2d DCA
1996).
82. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 130-31.

83. See id.
84. Id. at 134.

85. Id.
86. 667 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996).
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nance company." Pioneer trained the employee in the use of Pioneer's
equipment, provided personal management training from Pioneer's
president, and allowed the employee to attend seminars on "the
development of interpersonal skills[,] hiring and firing techniques," and
the use and repair of equipment. 8 In addition, the course of his
employment introduced the employee to an executive with one of
Pioneer's customers, Winn Dixie. 9 After Pioneer terminated the
employee, he arranged a meeting between 6ne of Pioneer's competitors
and the Winn Dixie executive.' Although the competitor previously
had difficulty obtaining access to the executive, the meeting produced
a contract giving the competitor the right to maintain the floors in
sixteen stores previously serviced by Pioneer.9 ' In that same month, the
competitor hired the employee.92 Subsequently, Pioneer filed suit
against the employee alleging that the employee had breached a
restrictive covenant and seeking an injunction prohibiting the employee
from "engaging in the floor care maintenance business."93
In Dyer, Pioneer asserted all of the legitimate business interests
identified in Hapney.94 Addressing each interest individually, the Dyer
court found that Pioneer could not obtain relief based on the employee's
knowledge of trade secrets or confidential information because the
employee had not "used" the secrets or information in his new
employment." Additionally, the Dyer court found that Pioneer lacked
a legitimate business interest in extraordinary training because the
employee's knowledge of Pioneer's product line and his management
training did not extend beyond the training a person in the employee's
position usually would receive.96 However, the Dyer court did find that
87. Id. at 963, 964.

88. Id. at 964.
89. Id. at 963.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 964, 965 & n.2.
95. Id. at 965 n.2; see also Sabina v. Dahlia Corp., 650 So. 2d 96, 97 (Fla. 2d DCA
1995). In Sabina, an insurance agent compiled a list containing confidential information about
his former employer's customers for his new employer to use in negotiations to purchase the
customers from the former employer. Id. at 97. The Second District Court of Appeal held that
the agent did not "use" the customer information against his former employer because "[t]he
only 'use' of the list was in the [former employer's] presence, for a purpose related directly to
the [former employer] itself, and thus with its tacit consent." Id. at 100. However, the Sabina
court noted in dicta that, had the terms of the non-competition agreement prohibited the agent
from servicing his former employer's customers, injunctive relief would have been appropriate.
Id. at 100 n.4.
96. Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 964. The court compared the employee in Dyer with the employee

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol49/iss1/3

14

Wagner: Striking a Balance?: The Florida Legislature Adopts an Unfair Com
EMPLOYEE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

the employee solicited Pioneer's customer in violation of Pioneer's
legitimate business interest in goodwill.9 7 Because this conduct also
triggered a presumption of irreparable harm under the 1990 amendment,
the Dyer court held that Pioneer was entitled to an injunction.98
Significantly, the Dyer court limited the injunction to prohibiting the
employee from soliciting Pioneer's existing customers.99 While
acknowledging that legitimate business interests in extraordinary training
or confidential information could have given the employee an unfair
advantage in any form of competition, the Dyer court found that Pioneer
failed to prove that the employee's mere employment with a competitor
would impinge on Pioneer's legitimate business interest in goodwill.'"
Thus, the Dyer court justified the limited relief it afforded Pioneer based
on Hapney'spolicy of narrowly tailoring relief to the legitimate business
interests proven by an employer."'
Arguably, Dyer's application of a "use" requirement for injunctive
relief relating to trade secrets or confidential information was inappropriate. While the 1990 amendment's plain language required use for a
presumption of irreparable harm to apply,"'2 the Dyer court failed to
consider whether Pioneer had demonstrated a right to relief without the
in Hapney. Id. at 964-65. After introducing its version of the legitimate business interest
approach to Florida law, the Hapney court considered whether an auto mechanic had received
extraordinary training in the course of his employment with a repair shop. Hapney, 579 So. 2d
at 128, 132. Although the mechanic had "extended his air-conditioning installation and repair
skills to include cruise control units and cellular telephones," the Hapney court likened this
training to the type of "skills which may be acquired by following the directions in the box or
learned ... by reading a manual." Id. at 132. Accordingly, the Hapney court held that the repair
shop had not satisfied its burden to prove an extraordinary level of training. Id.
97. Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 965.
98. Id. at 964.
99. Id. at 965. Presumably, "existing customers" referred to customers existing at the time
of the employee's departure from Pioneer. In most cases, enjoining solicitation of persons who
become an employer's customer after an employee's departure would prevent competition in
which the employee's prior employment did not create a competitive advantage.
100. See id. at 964-65 ("A former employer is not entitled to enjoin the former employee
from employment with a competitor unless the former employer has proved that the employment
itself causes irreparable injury.").
101. See id. at 965. The Dyer court noted:
The Hapney court stressed an individual's right to earn a living, even in
competition with [a] former employer, as long as the individual will not have an
unfair advantage in future competition with the former employer without the
covenant.... The injunction, therefore, should be tailored narrowly to protect
Pioneer Concepts' interest in preventing the solicitation of existing customers.
Id. at 964-65 (citations omitted).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1995).
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aid of the presumption."3 Since Hapney only required a reasonable
relationship between an employer's legitimate business interest and the
relief sought," 4 the application of a use requirement may have afforded too little relief to Pioneer."5
While the Dyer court may have granted injunctive relief too
narrowly, other courts proved too generous. Even among courts
purporting to follow Hapney, Dyer proved a unique example of an
appellate court carefully tailoring relief around an employer's legitimate
business interests. For example, in Health CareManagement Consulting,
Inc. v. McCombes,es the employee conducted seminars for the purpose
of developing clientele for a home health care agency consulting
firm." Eventually, the employee quit his job to dedicate all of his
efforts to operating his own company."es Upon his resignation, the
employee executed a restrictive covenant with his employer.It 3 Subsequently, the employee violated the covenant by soliciting his former
employer's existing customers."0
On these facts, the First District Court of Appeal found that the
employer had not demonstrated any legitimate business interest except
that in protecting its relationships with existing customers."' Nevertheless, the McCombes court upheld an injunction prohibiting the former
employee from conducting "home health care.., and clinical opera-

103. See Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 965 n.2.
104. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 130; supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
105. Another court similarly failed to consider the existence of a legitimate business interest
when § 542.33's presumptions did not apply in Kephart v. Hair Returns, Inc., 685 So. 2d 959
(4th DCA 1996), rev. denied, 695 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1997). In Kephart, the employer terminated
a hair replacement technician. Id. at 959. The employee subsequently breached a restrictive
covenant with her former employer by renting space next to the employer and continuing her
work as a hair replacement technician. Id. On these facts, the Fourth District Court of Appeal
held that § 542.33 did not authorize the injunction because the employee had not solicited any
of her former employer's customers. Id. at 960. Thus, even though the employer had lost
customers to its former employee, the employer was denied relief. Id.
The Kephart court never considered whether the employer had a broader legitimate business
interest in goodwill which was irreparably harmed by the competition from the employee. See
id. Instead, perhaps overstating the case, the court found that § 542.33 "validates only
contractual restrictions on soliciting an employer's old customers. There is no prohibition against
servicing those customers who voluntarily follow an employee to her new place of employment."
Id.
106. 661 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. Ist DCA 1995).
107. Id. at 1224.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 1226-27.
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tions" seminars in competition with his former employer."2 In so
doing, the McCombes court did not associate the employer's interest in
preventing the direct solicitation of its customers with the broader
interest in goodwill observed in Hapney."' Moreover, in a trend that
became characteristic of Hapney's progeny, the McCombes court failed
to consider whether the scope of relief granted reasonably was related
14
to that interest.
Arguably, McCombes and Dyer can be distinguished on their facts.
In contrast with the Dyer court, the McCombes court could have found
that the customer contacts developed by the employee in that case
created a sufficient interest in goodwill to warrant enjoining all
competition. If the McCombes court did engage in such an analysis
without revealing it in its opinion, Dyer and McCombes together expose
a hidden variable in the Hapney analysis. Even under the legitimate
business interest approach, the appropriate scope of relief depends on a
factual determination of what is necessary to protect the demonstrated

112. Id. at 1227.
113. See id. at 1226-27.
114. See id. The result in McCombes may reflect a confusion between the presumption of
irreparable harm triggered by a showing of direct solicitation of existing customers in the 1990
amendment and the legitimate business interest in goodwill identified in Hapney. See id. at 1226.
The 1990 amendment created a presumption of irreparable injury in situations where an
employee violated a non-competition agreement by directly soliciting an employer's existing
customers. FLA. STAT. § 542.22(2)(a) (1995). Consequently, employers had little difficulty
enjoining such conduct upon proof of solicitation in contravention of a covenant not to compete.
See McCombes, 661 So. 2d at 1226-27; Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc., 647 So. 2d 888, 891 (Fla.
2d DCA 1995). However, Hapney approved a broader legitimate business interest in customer
goodwill. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 131.
Kupscznk v. Blasters, Inc. provides another example of the failure of Hapney progeny to
carefully analyze individual legitimate business interests. See Kupscznk, 647 So. 2d at 890-91.
In Kupscznk, a water blasting company sought to prevent its former vice president from
competing with it by operating his own business. Id. at 889. The employee had violated the
terms of a restrictive covenant by soliciting and accepting business from his former employer's
customers. Id. at 890. The Second District Court of Appeal found that his former employer, a
water-blasting company, had legitimate business interests in "technical information, customer
lists, and trade secrets" known to the employee. Id. at 891. Consequently, the Kupscznk court
upheld an injunction prohibiting the employee from operating his new business. Id.
The Kupscznk court did not make a finding that the employee had employed any trade
secrets or confidential information in operating his new business, suggesting that an employer
could enjoin competition from a former employee based solely on the threat that the former
employee would use a trade secret or other confidentiality in competition. See id. at 889-91.
However, the facts of Kupscznk suggest that the employer could have had a legitimate business
interest in goodwill which the former employee violated by soliciting and serving the employer's
customers. If so, then protection of goodwill may explain the breadth of relief afforded by the
court.
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legitimate business interest." 5 Accordingly, as with ostensibly vaguer
standards of reasonableness, a result oriented court applying a legitimate
business interest test still can maneuver around precedent based on the
facts of the case before it.
While distinguishing Dyer and McCombes on their facts has tie
appeal of harmonizing seemingly contradictory cases, factual differences
do not adequately explain their outcomes. If anything, the employer in
Dyer was more deserving of an injunction against all competitive
activity because, unlike the McCombes employer, it had lost business
16
due to its employee's violation of a restrictive covenant. Furthermore, although the Second District Court of Appeal considered Dyer
17
after the First District Court of Appeal decided McCombes, the Dyer
court did not acknowledge its apparent conflict with McCombes."'
Indeed, Dyer and McCombes exemplify a failure by Hapney's progeny
to account for precedent. Consequently, the courts following the
legitimate business interest test did not bring the level of clarity to the
restrictive covenant area that Hapney's approach originally promised.
B. Jewett Orthopedic Clinic v. White: Rejecting Hapney
Not every court of appeal accepted Hapney's interpretation of the
1990 amendment to section 542.33. In Jewett Orthopedic Clinic v.
White,"9 the Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected Hapney's legitimate business interest test as the appropriate analysis under the 1990
amendment.'2 ° The Jewett court held that an unreasonable covenant
under the 1990 amendment should be identified using a "balancing
test... weigh[ing] the employer's interest in preventing competition
employee."' 2'
against the oppressive effect of the covenant on the
Although the Jewett court ostensibly revived the relevance of the
effect of a restraint on an employee, the disposition of Jewett indicated
that its approach would not materially reduce the scope of relief an
employer could expect as compared with the state of the law just before
the 1990 amendment." In Jewett, a surgeon executed an employment
115. See supra text accompanying notes 70-80.
116. See Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 963. The McCombes court did not consider whether the
employer had lost customers. See McCombes, 661 So. 2d at 1226 (stating that the mere fact of
direct contact with the employer's customers creates a presumption of irreparable injury).
117. Dyer was decided in 1996. See Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 961. McCombes was decided in
1995. See McCombes, 661 So. 2d at 1223.
118. See Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 963-66.
119. 629 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
120. Id. at 926-27.
121. Id. at 926.
122. See id. at 927 (including injury caused by competition within the definition of injury).
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contract including a covenant not to practice medicine or orthopedic
surgery for two years within the six counties from which his employer
drew customers.'" The trial court found that the surgeon's competition
with his former employer would not be unfair competition because the
surgeon's " 'practice of medicine would [not] be any different than the
practice of orthopedics by any other doctor in [the] community.' s924
Applying its balancing test, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that
these circumstances did not create an unreasonable covenant as a matter
of law.'" Thus, Jewett upheld the proposition, often repeated in
Florida case law during the previous decade,'" that section 542.33
validates covenants restricting ordinary competition."
C. Lovell v. Levy Farms, Inc.: Avoiding the Issue
While Hapney and Jewett stood in conflict, the Third District Court
of Appeal failed to clarify its approach under the 1990 amendment. In
Lovell Farms, Inc. v. Levy,' the Third District Court of Appeal held
that the reasonableness of a covenant not involving one of the activities
expressly identified in the 1990 amendment should be evaluated using
a "balancing test ...weigh[ing] the public interest, the potential effects
on the employee, and the legitimate business interests of the employer."129 Although the Lovell Farms court used the legitimate business
interests language employed in Hapney,"° courts before Hapney
employed similar terminology without actually using the legitimate
business interest approach."' Moreover, the consideration of the
employer's interests in the context of a balancing test caused the Lovell
Farms approach to closely resemble that used in Jewett.3 2 Consequently, Lovell Farms left the Third District without clear guidance as
to whether it should follow Hapney or Jewett or use some other test.

123. Id. at 923-24.
124. Id. at 924 (quoting the judgment of the trial court).
125. Id. at 927.
126. See supra pt. III.
127. See Jewett, 629 So. 2d at 924 ("[TIhe question whether the noncompete agreement is
unenforceable does not turn on whether [the plaintiff's] opening a competing practice would be
'unfair.' ").
128. 641 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994).
129. Id. at 105.
130. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 130.
131. See, e.g., Capelouto, 183 So. 2d at 534.
132. See Jewett, 629 So. 2d at 925-26.
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V. 1996: THE NEW STATUTE
The misappropriation theory underlying Hapney's legitimate business
interest test 3 promised to create a middle ground between the unwavering pro-employee policy behind Love"M and the automatic,
unreasoned approach that developed under section 542.33 before the
1990 amendment. 35 Nevertheless, Hapney did not neatly resolve all
of the problems which surrounded restrictive covenants before the 1990
amendment. First, not every district court of appeal accepted Hapney's
legitimate business interest approach. 36 Second, as McCombes demonstrated, the courts which did follow Hapney limited the predictive value
of the legitimate business interest approach by failing to clearly
elucidate their reasoning.'37 Third, Hapney justified the application of
the legitimate business interest approach through dubious means. The
language of the 1990 amendment made no mention of goodwill or
extraordinary training.3 3 As a consequence, the Hapney court attempted to justify its holding by using the Florida courts' prior allusions to
employers' "legitimate interests" and similar terms as evidence that
Florida had applied a legitimate business interest approach since the
Legislature first adopted section 542.33 in 1953.' In fact, the courts
interpreting section 542.33 before the 1990 amendment did not require
a showing of a legitimate business interest in the sense explicated in
Hapney.140
In an attempt to resolve these problems and to restore order in the
restrictive covenant area, the Florida Legislature passed section 542.335
in 1996.' 4' The following sub-parts analyze section 542.335. Sub-part
A discusses its framework. Sub-part B identifies potential litigation
issues. Finally, Sub-part C makes drafting recommendations for
practitioners.
A. Statutory Framework
Section 542.335, which applies solely to contracts executed on or
after July 1, 1996, completely restructures the restrictive covenant

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See supra pt. W.A.
See supra pt. II.
See supra pt. III.
See supra pts. IV.B & IV.C.
See supra text accompanying notes 106-18.
See FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(b) (1995).
See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 131.
Chandra v. Gadodia, 610 So. 2d 15, 18-19 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992).
See Grant & Steele, supra note 2, at 54.
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statute.'42 Parrotting Hapney's "reasonably related" standard, section
542.335 requires an employer to plead and prove that a covenant is
"reasonably necessary"' 43 to protect one or more legitimate business
interests to state a cause of action for the breach of a restrictive
covenant.'" Section 542.335 provides a non-exclusive list of legitimate
business interests which an employer may plead:
1. Trade secrets, as defined in [section] 688.002(4) [of
the Florida Statutes].
2. Valuable confidential business or professional information that otherwise does not qualify as trade secrets.
3. Substantial relationships with specific prospective or
existing customers, patients, or clients.
4. Customer, patient, or client goodwill associated with:
a. An ongoing business or professional practice, by way
of trade name, trademark, service mark, or "trade dress";
b. A specific geographic location; or
c. A specific marketing or trade area.
5. Extraordinary or specialized training.
Once an employer establishes that a covenant is reasonably necessary
to protect a legitimate business interest, the burden shifts to the
employee to show that the restraint is "overbroad, overlong, or otherwise
not reasonably
necessary to protect the established legitimate business
46
interest."'
In addition to adopting the legitimate business interest test, section
542.335 requires that a covenant be "reasonable in time, area, and line
of business."' 47 Section 542.335 also adopts the Miller Mechanical
approach by allowing courts to rewrite unreasonable terms to make them
reasonable. 48 Thus, courts will not invalidate
an entire covenant
49
merely because it is partially unreasonable.
142. See id. at 54.
143. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(c) (Supp. 1996). Unlike its predecessor, § 542.335 does not
expressly limit the classes of enforceable restrictive covenants to those incident to employment,
to the sale of a business, to the sale of all of a shareholder's shares in a corporation, and to the
dissolution of a partnership. Compare FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1995) with FLA. STAT. § 542.335
(Supp. 1996). However, § 542.335's acceptance of the legitimate business interest approach
probably limits enforcement of restrictive covenants to situations similar to those enumberated
in § 542.33.
144. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(l)(b) (Supp. 1996).
145. Id. For the definition of "trade secrets" incorporated in the statute, see supra note 78.
146. Id. § 542.335(1)(c).

147. Id. § 542.335(1).
148. Id. § 542.335(1)(c).
149. Id.
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With respect to time, section 542.335 creates two sets of rebuttable
s
presumptions applicable to "postterm" covenants with an employee."
If the restriction is "predicated upon protection of trade secrets," a
restraint of five years or less is presumed reasonable and a restraint
extending longer than ten years is presumed unreasonable.' Where
the restriction is "not predicated upon the protection of trade secrets,"
a restraint of six months or less is presumed reasonable and a restraint
extending longer than two years is presumed unreasonable."
Section 542.335 contains two provisions relating to an employer's
access to injunctive relief.15 3 First, the new statute resurrects the
Capraro rule by creating a presumption of irreparable harm once an
employer proves that an employee has violated an enforceable restrictive
covenant." Second, section 542.335 prohibits a judge from entering
55
a temporary injunction unless the employer "gives a proper bond."'
Several other provisions in section 542.335 may affect a person's
access to relief for the breach of a restrictive covenant. First, the new
statute contains an express directive to the courts regarding how to
interpret a restrictive covenant. 6 Eschewing narrow constructions of
restraints, constructions against restraints, and constructions against a
covenant's drafter, section 542.335 instructs the judiciary to interpret a
"restrictive covenant in favor of providing reasonable protection to all
legitimate business interests established" by an employer."s Second,
adopting the language of the 1990 amendment to section 542.33, section
542.335 permits courts to consider a covenant's effect on the "public
health, safety, and welfare" in determining the covenant's enforceability.15 However, the statute also requires a court that invalidates a
covenant on public policy grounds to "specifically" articulate the public
policy that justifies its holding. 59 Moreover, the court must find that
the public policy "substantially outweigh[s]" the legitimate business
6°
interests of the person seeking to enforce the covenant." Third, the
statute codifies pre-1990 amendment case law by prohibiting the
consideration of "individualized economic or other hardship" imposed

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

See id. § 542.335(1)(d)1., (e).
Id. § 542.335(1)(e).
Id. § 542.335(1)(d)1.
See id. § 542.335(1)0).
Id.
Id.
See id. § 542.335(1)(h).
Id.
Id. § 542.335(1)(g)4.
Id. § 542.335(1)(i).
Id.
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on an employee by the enforcement of a covenant.' 6 ' Fourth, section
542.335 empowers an employee to raise "all other pertinent legal or
equitable defenses."'' The available defenses include an employer's
exit from the "area or line of business that is the subject of the
action." 63 However, this defense is limited to circumstances where an
employee's violation of the covenant did not cause the employer to
discontinue its business.'" Lastly, if the person seeking relief is a
third-party beneficiary or an assignee or successor of a party to the
contract containing the restrictive covenant, section 542.335 imposes
special conditions on the enforceability of the covenant.' 65 If the
person seeking relief is a third-party beneficiary, the covenant must
"expressly" identify the person as a third-party beneficiary and must
"expressly" state that the covenant exists for the person's benefit.'" If
the person seeking relief is an assignee or successor, the covenant must
"expressly" state that an assignee or successor of a party to the contract
may enforce the covenant.167
B. Litigation Issues
Litigation issues raised by section 542.335 may be categorized within
three areas. First, employers and employees probably will disagree over
the legitimate business interests and the scope of reasonably necessary
relief implied by the facts of each case. Second, litigation may arise
over other threshold issues such as invalidation based on public policy.
Third, the courts will have to resolve ambiguities concerning the
operation of section 542.335's presumptions.
1. Legitimate Business Interests and the Scope
of Reasonably Necessary Relief
Section 542.335 appears to leave most legitimate business interests
where Hapney put them. Following Hapney's lead,'6 section 542.335's
list of legitimate business interests is non-exclusive. 69 Moreover,
section 542.335's list is almost identical to the list in Hapney.'70

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. § 542.335(1)(g)1.
Id. § 542.335(1)(g)3.
Id. § 542.335(1)(g)2.
Id.
See id. § 542.335(1)(f).
See id. § 542.335(1)(f)1.
See id. § 542.335(1)(f)2.
See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 131.
169. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (Supp. 1996).
170. Compare Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 131 with FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b) (Supp. 1996);
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Nevertheless, differences may exist concerning goodwill. Hapney
recognized a legitimate business interest in "customer goodwill,"'' . but
neither Hapney nor its progeny further defined the scope of "customer
goodwill" except to say that it was implicated by certain customer
solicitations. 72 In contrast, section 542.335 provides a detailed list of
goodwill-related interests including "substantial" customer relationships
and goodwill associated with certain intellectual property rights, a
"specific geographic location," or a "specific marketing or trade
area.

, 173

The breadth of section 542.335's goodwill-related legitimate business
interests may substantially affect the balance the statute creates between
employer and employee interests. Under Hapney, the scope of the
legitimate business interest in goodwill was not critical because section
542.33's presumption of irreparable harm only operated when the
employee solicited the employer's customers, 74 and courts failed to
look for evidence of irreparable harm when the presumption did not
apply. 75 Under section 542.335, a presumption of irreparable harm
attaches to all legitimate business interests.'76 Thus, if the courts
follow section 542.335's plain language and apply the goodwill-related
legitimate business interests in situations not involving customer
solicitation, section 542.335 may provide employers relief in circumstances in which Hapney's progeny would not.
Even if an employer pleads and proves the existence of a legitimate
business interest, the employer still must demonstrate a sufficient
relationship between the interest proven and the relief sought. In this
regard, section 542.335 provides clarity where Hapney's approach was
lacking. The Hapney court had to adopt its two-tiered approach'" to
reconcile the language of section 542.33 with the broader theory of
legitimate business interests.7 7 This caused confusion on two levels.
see also supra text accompanying notes 75 & 145. Both Hapney and § 542.335 include trade
secrets, confidential business information, and ordinary or specialized training on their lists of
legitimate business interests. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 131; FLA..STAT. § 542.335(l)(b) (Supp.
1996). Cases after Hapney adopted the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act's definition of trade
secrets that is also used by § 542.335. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b)1. (Supp. 1996); supra
note 78 and accompanying text.
171. Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 131; see also supra text accompanying note 75.
172. See, e.g., Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 965; see also supra note 76.
173. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(b)3., 4. (Supp. 1996).
174. FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1995).
175. See, e.g., Kephart v. Hair Returns, Inc., 685 So. 2d 959, 960 (4th DCA 1996), rev.
denied, 695 So. 2d 699 (Fla. 1997). For a discussion of Kephart, see supra note 105.
176. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)j) (Supp. 1996).
177. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 131; supra text accompanying notes 73-74 & 84-85.
178. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1995).
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First, as McCombes demonstrated, some courts used the presumptions
created by section 542.33 to broadly afford relief without addressing
whether such relief was necessary to protect the, legitimate business
interests actually proven.' 9 Thus, the two-tiered approach minimized
the legitimate business interest approach's ability to narrowly tailor
relief as contemplated in Hapney.'80 Second, several courts, including
the Dyer court, construed the "use" language in section 542.33 to create
a condition precedent to establishing the violation of a legitimate
business interest rather than merely to create a condition precedent
" ' In contrast, Hapney
regarding the operation of a presumption.18
alluded to a reasonable relationship test to determine the appropriate
nexus between the relief sought and a legitimate business interest. 2
Because relief and a legitimate business interest might be reasonably
related even though the employee had not actually used the interest in
competition, the courts sometimes applied the legitimate interests test
too narrowly. 3
Section 542.335 eliminates the two-tiered approach by requiring the
same level of proof to protect each legitimate business interest.'84
Under section 542.335, an employer may obtain the benefit of a
presumption of irreparable harm as soon as the employer pleads and
proves that relief is reasonably necessary to protect its legitimate
business interests.' Thus, the new statute adopts the approach alluded
to in Hapney and disposes of the "use" language employed by section
542.33.
This change likely will work to favor employers. While the
reasonably necessary standard's inclusion in the statute may require a
court to make findings regarding the need for relief and an employer's
legitimate business interests, courts may repeat their past mistake of
granting an injunction too broadly once an employer demonstrates an
entitlement to some relief.186 Moreover, a court might interpret section
542.335's reasonably necessary language to allow enforcement of a

179. See, e.g., McCombes, 661 So. 2d at 1226.
180. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 130.
181. See Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 965 n.2; Sabina v. Dahlia Corp., 650 So. 2d 96, 100 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1995).
182. See Hapney, 579 So. 2d at 130.
183. See Grant & Steele, supra note 2, at 54 n.14. One court similarly erred by holding that
after the 1990 amendment § 542.33 did not protect goodwill unless a former employee solicits
the employer's customers. See Kephart, 685 So. 2d at 960. For a discussion of Kephart, see
supra note 105.
184. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(c) (Supp. 1996).
185. See id. § 542.335(1)(i).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 106-18.
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covenant where competition by the employee merely threatens actual use
of a legitimate business interest. Indeed, in the area of trade secrets,
section 542.335's Senate sponsor has argued that threatened use should
be enough to trigger injunctive relief.'87
Employees' counsel should be wary of arguments that relief is
reasonably necessary because of potential use. The threat to employees
appears greatest in the area of goodwill. By definition, competition from
a former employee has some potential to take customers away from an
employer. Consequently, if the courts interpret section 542.335's
goodwill-related interests broadly 8 and also find that the potential to
misappropriate goodwill creates a reasonable necessity for protection,
any competition from a former employee could become unfair competition subject to elimination via a restrictive covenant. If that happens,
section 542.335 will leave employees in the same precarious position
they stood in under the original statute.'89
2. Other Threshold Issues
Although section 542.335 empowers the courts to invalidate
covenants contrary to the public health, safety, and welfare,"9 public
policy arguments probably will not provide fertile ground for employees
in litigation. Despite the Capelouto court's inclusion of a public interest
element in its analysis 9 ' and the 1990 amendment's authorization to
invalidate covenants contrary to the "public health, safety, or welfare,"'19 public policy arguments have proven almost universally
unsuccessful.' 93 Because section 542.335 contains the same "public
health, safety, and welfare" language as the 1990 amendment to section
542.33,' section 542.335 does not evince a legislative intent to
expand the role of public policy in the restrictive covenant area. Indeed,
section 542.335's introduction of the new requirement that a public
policy "substantially outweigh" the employer's legitimate business
interests to justify the invalidation of a covenant 95 may render the
public policy exception a dead letter.

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
(1995).
195.

See Grant & Steel, supra note 2, at 54 n.14.
For a discussion of this possibility, see supra text accompanying notes 171-76.
See supra pt. II.
FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(g)4. (Supp. 1996).
Capelouto, 182 So. 2d 534; see also supra text accompanying note 38.
FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a) (1995).
See supra notes 50 & 68 and accompanying text.
Compare FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(g)4. (Supp. 1996) with FLA. STAT. § 542.33(2)(a)
FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(i) (Supp. 1996).
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Given that no appellate court to sit since the enactment of the
original statute has invalidated a restrictive covenant because of its
effect on an employee, section 542.335's dismissal of "individualized... hardship" from the possible justifications for refusing to
enforce a covenant 96 is not surprising. Although section 542.335's
plain language seems to create a blanket prohibition against consideration of hardship, 97 employees should argue that it may be considered
where relevant to an ultimate fact such as the existence of a legitimate
business interest. Moreover, where the hardship is severe, employees
may wish to note its existence as background information in the hope
that it will sway the court in other matters.
3. Presumptions
Two litigation issues probably will arise over section 542.335's
presumptions. First, the statutory presumptions regarding reasonableness
in time do not clarify which party has the burden of production in all
circumstances. 9 Where a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness
exists, the employer clearly gains the advantage of not having the
burden of production.' 99 Conversely, where applicable, the rebuttable
presumption of unreasonableness clearly places the burden of production
on the employer.' However, the statute does not expressly allocate
the burden of production to either party where neither presumption
operates."' Employers may argue that the statute's directive to interpret covenants in favor of protecting legitimate business interests2'
justifies placing the burden on the employee. However, an interpretational provision does not necessarily allocate burdens where no legislative
intent exists to support such an allocation. 3 Moreover, as the Senate
staff analysis observes, the employer might be expected to carry the

196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Id. § 542.335(1)(g)(i).
Id.
See id. § 542.335(1)(d).
See id.
See id.
See id.

202. See id. § 542.335(1)(h).
203. Neither the Senate nor the House staff analyses reveal any such legislative intent. See
STAFF OF FLORIDA SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, CS/SBs 282 & 1224: SENATE STAFF

ANALYSIS

AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT (Apr. 11, 1996) (on file with committee)

[hereinafter

SENATE COMM. REPORT]; STAFF OF FLORIDA HOUSE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, CS/HBs

611 & 375: FINAL BILL ANALYSIS & ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT (May 30, 1996) (on file
with committee) [hereinafter HOUSE COMM. REPORT].
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burden of production as the petitioning party in a suit for the breach of
a covenant. 204
A second issue lies in the determination of whether section 542.335's
presumption of irreparable harm is rebuttable or conclusive. Interpreting
the 1990 amendment, one court of appeal found that the presumptions
created in section 542.33 were irrebuttable.03 The plain language of
section 542.335 suggests the same result regarding its presumption of
irreparable harm because the presumptions regarding reasonableness in
time and space specify that they are rebuttable2 whereas the language
creating the presumption of irreparable harm contains no explanatory
modifier. 7 However, the legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended for section 542.335 to create a rebuttable presumption of
irreparable harm.2 "8 The original House and Senate bills unequivocally
created a conclusive presumption of irreparable harm.2" Each chamber
amended the bill in committee to remove the conclusive language.21
Thus, although section 542.335 does not specify that the presumption is
rebuttable,' the removal of the language specifically creating a
conclusive presumption strongly suggests that the Legislature intended
the presumption to be rebuttable.2" 2 Accordingly, the outcome in
litigation probably will depend on whether the court looks beyond the
plain language of the statute to ascertain its meaning.
C. Drafting Recommendations
Initially, drafting a restrictive covenant governed by section 542.335
raises the same issues presented by the preparation of any contract. Like
its predecessors,213 section 542.335 does not create a cause of action.214 Consequently, an employer seeking protection still must
204. See SENATE CoMM. REPORT, supra note 203, at 3.
205. See Sun Elastic Corp. v. O.B. Indus., 603 So. 2d 516, 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992).
206. FLA. STAT. § 542.335(l)(d) (Supp. 1996).
207. See id. § 542.335(1)0).
208. See STAFF OF FLORIDA SENATE COMM. ON JUDICIARY, STATEMENT OF SUBSTANTIAL
CHANGES CONTAINED IN SENATE BILLS 282 AND 1224, at 1 (1996) (on file with committee)
[hereinafter SENATE COMM. REPORT ADDENDUM]; HOUSE COMM. REPORT, supra note 203, at
10.
209. SENATE COMM. REPORT, supra note 203, at 4; HOUSE COMM. REPORT, supra note
203, at 7.
210. SENATE COMM. REPORT ADDENDUM, supra note 208, at 1; HOUSE COMM. REPORT,
supra note 203, at 10.
211. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(j) (Supp. 1996).
212. See SENATE COMM. REPORT ADDENDUM, supra note 208, at 1; HOUSE COMM.
REPORT, supra note 203, at 10.
213. See FLA. STAT. § 542.33 (1995); FLA. STAT § 542.12 (1953).
214. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (Supp. 1996).
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produce an otherwise valid contract with terms that afford the relief the
employer seeks." 5 The corollary to this is that, where an employee has
sufficient bargaining power, the employee may retain his or her ability
to compete with an employer by refraining from agreeing to a restraint.
Accordingly, any restraint should contain language regarding its
duration, area, and line of business.
Given an otherwise enforceable contract, section 542.335 does not
offer the opportunity for an employer and employee to bargain around
its provisions by waiving an employee's right to object to certain
facts.216 An employer must plead and prove the reasonable relationship
between its legitimate business interests and the relief sought.
Moreover, the parties cannot agree in the restrictive covenant to waive
the requirement that the employer post an injunction bond before
obtaining preliminary relief.218 Nevertheless, section 542.335 does not
prevent an employer from using the contract as evidence against an
employee. 29 Accordingly, an employer should include language
identifying the nature of the legitimate business interests which will be
created by the employee's employment.' Employees should attempt
to exclude such language from a contract because it could prevent an
employer from having to produce the evidence it might otherwise need
to satisfy its burdens of production and proof. 1
Because section 542.335 codifies the Miller Mechanical rule
permitting a court to freely modify unreasonable contractual terms to
make them reasonable,2' employers may continue to draft broad
covenants without fear of losing all of their benefits. Because this
enables employers to avoid drafting default provisions which apply if
other terms are found invalid, a restrictive covenant under section
542.335 need not reveal the possibility that a court could declare the
covenant wholly or partially invalid. As a result, employers may
continue to use patently unreasonable terms as traps for employees who
are unaware of section 542.335's protections.
Employers should be careful to comply with section 542.335's
requirements for enforcement by third-party beneficiaries, assignees, and

215. See id. § 542.335(1); Grant & Steele, supra note 2, at 54 ("[The term 'restrictive
covenants' . . . is all-inclusive and includes all contractual restrictions upon competition.").
216. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335 (Supp. 1996).

217. Id. § 542.335(l)(b) & (c).
218. Id. § 542.335(2)0).
219. See id. § 542.335.
220. See Valiulis, supra note 9, at 48.
221. See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(c) (Supp. 1996) (stating that once the employer has
established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employee).
222. See id.; supra note 53.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1997

29

Florida Law Review, Vol. 49, Iss. 1 [1997], Art. 3
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49

successors.' If the covenant is intended to benefit a person other than
a party to the contract, the drafter should identify the person by name
and state that the covenant exists for the person's benefit.22 To make
a covenant enforceable by an assignee or successor, the drafter should
include language authorizing enforcement by such parties.' while.
third-party beneficiaries probably will not exist in many contracts,
employers should routinely include language in restrictive covenants
authorizing enforcement by assignees and successors. The failure to
include such language could prove costly if the employer wishes to sell
his or her business but cannot transfer to a buyer the right to enjoin
competition from former employees.
VII. CONCLUSION

Judged by the goals of its drafters, 226 section 542.335 is only a
partial success. By resolving the split between the district courts of
appeal following the 1990 amendment to section 542.33,227 section
542.335 may provide much needed uniformity in the restrictive covenant
area. Moreover, section 542.335's adoption of Hapney's legitimate
business interest approach indicates that the new statute may afford the
balance that eluded the Florida judiciary at common law and under
the original non-competition statute.229 However, Hapney's progeny
suggest that the new statute will not result in predictable victories for
either employers or employees;23 courts probably will consider the
relationship between an employer's legitimate business interests and the
relief an employer seeks on a case-by-case basis.23 The resulting
uncertainty probably will prevent section 542.335 from providing the
predictable results its drafters sought to achieve.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(f) (Supp. 1996); supra text accompanying notes 165-67.
See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(f)1. (Supp. 1996); supra text accompanying note 166.
See FLA. STAT. § 542.335(I)(f)2. (Supp. 1996); supra text accompanying note 167.
See Grant & Steel, supra note 2, at 53; see also supra text accompanying note 5.
See supra pt. IV.
See supra pt. II.
See supra pt. III.
See supra pt. IV.A.
See, e.g., Dyer, 667 So. 2d at 965; McCombes, 661 So. 2d at 1227.
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